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On March 1, Charles Michel, President of the European Council, visited Tbilisi
to witness Georgia’s rapid descent into authoritarian rule. A week before, riot
police stormed the headquarters of UNM (United National Movement), a former
governing party and Georgia’s largest opposition force, to detain its newly-elected
Chairman, Nika Melia. This move, old-fashioned by today’s standards of stealth-
authoritarianism, rang alarm bells in western capitals, where there is still support for
Georgia’s declared, yet waning, liberal-democratic aspirations.
Mediation efforts between the government and opposition forces, initiated by
President Michel in Tbilisi, brought the rule of law and the institutions of justice to the
forefront of negotiations. The abuse and subsequent erosion of the rule of law are
familiar problems for the EU inside the bloc. Recognized as the foundational pillar of
the Union’s constitutional architecture, the EU has been actively promoting it in its
neighbourhood, including in Georgia, which sought closer ties and the prospects of
eventual EU-membership.
The EU institutions’ experience of handling rule of law crises at home should better
inform its neighbourhood policy. Somewhat paradoxically, the EU has greater
leverage in its neighbourhood countries, like Georgia, than it has towards its internal
problematic members.
The impetus for the rule of law crisis
Georgia’s political stalemate has been deepening since the October 2020
parliamentary elections, in which GD (Georgian Dream party), led by billionaire
tycoon Bidzina Ivanishvili, claimed victory for the third consecutive term. Opposition
forces have declared the election massively rigged and boycotted the work of the
legislature. As a result of this ongoing boycott strategy, only 6 out of 60 opposition
MPs have assumed their office in the 150-member chamber. Talks facilitated
between GD and opposition forces by the ambassadors of the EU and the US have
quickly deadlocked.
The detention of Melia in 2021 goes back to a charge from 2019. In June 2019,
Melia gave an inflammatory speech at a spontaneous mass demonstration against
the GD government’s Russia policy, for which he was charged with the “incitement
of violent takeover of the parliament premises”. Riot police brutally cracked down
on this protest, citing the imminent storming of the parliamentary premises as a
justification. While the GD-controlled parliamentary supermajority had immediately
stripped Melia off his parliamentary immunity, he was not detained. The prosecution
motioned for his detention after Melia had not complied with the court order to pay
bail: Melia deliberately chose disobedience as part of the overall protest strategy
against the regime.
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Melia’s detention was preceded by PM Giorgi Gakharia’s scandalous resignation.
Among the numerous PM’s Ivanishvili’s party has had for its ninth year in power,
Gakharia turned out to be the only one who resigned on his own will, in anticipation
of imminent ouster, and furthermore slammed the door behind him. In a brief
televised resignation speech, Gakharia bluntly stated that his inability to convince
“the team” of the political impropriety of Melia’s detention was the reason for his
resignation. He exposed what was already widely known in Georgia – that the
judiciary had acted as Ivanishvili’s executioner against his enemies, and that the
oligarch’s close circle in the party leadership (“the team”) had been in charge of
making final determinations on the fate of opposition leaders (and anyone else in the
country for that matter).
Gakharia’s refusal to enforce the court order on Melia’s pre-trial detention and his
subsequent exit, has been followed by the return of Ivanishvili’s old confidant: Irakli
Garibashvili. The once estranged former PM and Defense Minister under Gakharia is
known for his unconditional personal devotion to Ivanishvili. It was Garibashvili who
ordered the enforcement of Melia’s detention without hesitation.
Ironically, even after former PM Gakharia’s public statement, GD has not dropped its
rhetoric of the rule of law in justification of its defiant stance on Melia’s case. Melia,
GD’s speakers continue to insist, enjoys equality before the law and has to comply
with the verdicts of “independent” courts. GD’s preaching on the rule of law and
judicial independence, while undermining the very same values in practice, goes
beyond mere hypocrisy and assumes overtly comic forms of public mockery.
Captured judicial institutions
In Georgia, it has become common knowledge that the judiciary is personally
controlled by Ivanishvili through a notorious elite of judicial bureaucrats, known as
“judicial clansmen”. Judicial clansmen are a powerful group of former and current
court presidents, who switched their masters following the change of government
in 2012. By 2019, in the words of Freedom House, Georgia has established itself
among  “… hybrid regimes and autocracies that routinely mete out politicized
justice.”
By the end of 2019, via a combination of abusive constitutional amendments and
legislative reforms, the ‘clansmen-Ivanishvili’ coalition had successfully packed the
Supreme Court, “following a ‘highly dysfunctional and unprofessional’ appointment
process […] in an ominous sign that such incidents [of politicized justice] would
not be limited to the lower courts”. Ivanishvili has constitutionally entrenched the
clansmen’s grip on judiciary power by cementing their control across judiciary
institutions. An already tense situation has since been aggravated by arbitrary
arrests and a number of controversial court cases.
While Georgia’s rule of law problem may not be that different from the problems the
EU faces from within – in fact, they are often all too similar to Poland or Hungary –
the EU’s institutional responses to these challenges necessarily differ. Paradoxically,
the EU has greater leverage to address these problems in Georgia than at home.
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The EU and the erosion of the rule of law at home
versus in its neighbourhood
Internally, the EU’s response to rule of law crises has been undermined by the
leverage the suspect member states enjoy inside the Union’s institutions and politics.
Much has been written (this blog included) on the series of infringement proceedings
against these states and developing ECJ jurisprudence on judicial independence
in the context of, inter alia, the Polish rule of law crisis. The Hungarian and Polish
cases should make it clear to the EU that offending governments respond to different
sets of incentives, which are more related to practical needs of survival in power,
than ideational or value commitments. In this respect, the EU has significantly more
powerful leverage vis-à-vis the Ivanishvili regime in Georgia than it has over its
internal villains.
Due to the Ivanishvili regime’s incoherent response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the
Georgian economy is in shambles. The regime needs the EU’s aid to balance the
budget and sustain its extensive networks of clients, which comprise much of its
electoral power base. By making its aid conditional, the EU could exert significant
pressure on the regime to stop the rampant rule of law abuse. Currently, given the
hopeless trajectory of Georgia’s economic recovery, Ivanishvili’s survival strategy
stands on twin pillars of foreign aid funds and his immense personal wealth (large
portions of which are located in Europe).
Aid conditionality coupled with (the threat of) personal sanctions on Ivanishvili’s
wealth could serve as the most effective deterrence of abusive behavior. The case
of Vladimir Plahotniuc, an oligarch who, like Ivanishvili, had captured Moldova’s
institutions of public power, is instructive here. He fled the country and his regime
collapsed, after an opposition effort supported by western powers and paired
with sanctions succeeded. In part, for corrupt practices involving allegations of
instrumentalizing Moldova’s judiciary in grand money laundering schemes.
For decades, since regaining independence, hopes for an eventual integration
into the EU have energized Georgian society’s efforts for liberalization and
democratization. Public opinion polls show steady support for EU integration.
GD exploits this sentiment, while undermining every constitutional value of the
EU, sabotaging even distant hopes of Georgia’s possible EU integration, despite
proclaiming its intention to apply for Georgia’s EU membership in 2024. The EU’s
neighborhood policy should capitalize more on Georgians’ public support. It should
tailor the pressure it applies to the regime so that Georgian society is affected the
least. It should be more careful to make sure that the EU’s aid to Georgian society is
not abused by the regime to perpetuate itself and undermine everything that the EU
stands for.
Over years, especially after the signature of EU-Georgia association agreement in
2014, the EU has been investing increasing efforts and resources into rule of law
promotion projects in Georgia, specifically targeting judicial institutions. Following the
Supreme Court packing in 2019, the EU has become increasingly frustrated by the
waste of its rule of law assistance in the hands of an abusive regime.
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Before giving an additional Euro to possibly ineffective projects of rule of law
promotion in Georgia, the EU should make sure that it does not further empower
judicial clansmen and thus strengthen Ivanishvili’s grip on Georgia’s judiciary. More
has to be done to empower the struggle of civil society against the degradation of the
rule of law at the hands of Ivanishvili’s judicial clansmen and other elements of his
regime.
Undoing politicized justice is a political project
demanding political support
The EU continues to press Georgia on the rule of law and judicial independence.
Decision-makers in Brussels are clearly aware of the failures of their previous efforts,
hence President Michel’s emphases on the rule of law and the judiciary in the recent
mediation, but it is not as apparent whether they have a coherent strategy on how to
deal with it.  The EU needs to focus more on not wasting its funds on façade projects
of the rule of law promotion. Without a systemic reshaping of Georgia’s judiciary and
the dismantling of politicized justice, present purely technical assistance programs
will not bolster the capacity or legitimacy of Georgia’s justice system. This is a task of
fundamental political importance; it requires strong political consensus in Georgian
society and politics, and the EU is in a strong position to help make it happen.
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